https://cpes.org.uk/om/files/original/4060880da6e7d14800062110195fff19.pdf 455303c3a1cbeb31bec4dadfaea73f36 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Cambridge Economic Policy Review Volume 8 No 2 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Cambridge Economic Policy Review Volume 8 No 1 front cover Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1982 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Chapter 5 Policy coordination and the institutional framework The need for improved coordination The problems which governments face in devising and organising their spatial development policies are inherently complex. Spatial objectives are rarely spelt out with precision, but rather expressed as a general aim to reduce geographical disparities in incomes, unemployment and public service provision. This lack of precision leaves plenty of scope for different interpretations to be made in different parts of the government machine. Moreover spatial objectives tend to have lower priority than national policy goals such as an efficient and growing economy, rising living standards, a good standard of housing, education and health, an effective system of transport, law and order etc. Each of these national goals is usually the responsibility of a single and powerful central government department. But the responsibility for ensuring the achievement of spatial objectives is spread around like ground-bait not only throughout all the central government departments but also throughout a second tier of government, namely over 500 local authorities, and a host of other institutions including the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies, the English Industrial Estates Corporation, the Highlands and Islands Development Board, the Development Board of Rural Wales, COSIRA, and New Town Development Corporations including those for the dockland areas of London and Liverpool. The many interactions which occur between different spatial policies and between these policies and national sectoral policies mean that there needs to be a high degree of coordination if all the different objectives are to be secured effectively. The process of coordination involves consultation, bargaining, compromise and agreement between departments on the discharge of their functional responsibilities and subsequently on the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the policies pursued. Inefficient coordination is likely to lead to ineffective and conflicting policies, wasteful expenditure and failure to take action at all on occasion. Efficient horizontal coordination across different government departments requires agree- 58 ment on a common set of aims and on the spatial impact of different sectoral policies as well as a recognition of the trade-offs between the different objectives of each department including spatial policy objectives. But the problems associated with the coordination of spatial and sectoral policies between different central government departments are compounded by the need for vertical coordination between central and local government. The existence of local government vastly increases the number of elected bodies concerned with the regional incidence of sectoral policies and with regional and urban policies per se. Local authorities exercise a considerable degree of autonomy and since their primary concern is with local economic and social conditions there are strong pressures on them to persuade central government to treat them favourably. They may, where possible, seek to reverse by independent action what they regard as unfavourable treatment. If the policies of each tier of government are not well coordinated, there is likely to be tension and conflict. In Britain this conflict has been particularly marked in recent years. In some centralised states such as France and Italy, and in all federal states, there is a third tier of government, namely the regional tier. The existence of this further tier has in some countries increased the potential for conflict but in others the regional tier has evolved specifically as a policy coordinating body. Policies need coordinating because they interact with one another. These interactions can be either complementary or perverse. Urban and regional policies inevitably interact because both sets of policies are concerned with reducing disparities in social and economic conditions between different parts of the country. Sometimes, as in the case of Merseyside, a single conurbation or city becomes a 'region' for regional policy purposes and regions singled out for special treatment may be dominated by an urban area (such as Clydeside in Scotland). In depressed largely rural regions it may be relatively easy to identify the regional problem and its causes. But if the depressed region contains a large city, then the regional problem will be compounded by problems which are specifically urban in nature. In these circumstances regional policies aimed at region-wide problems will impinge on urban problems and objectives and will thus influence the effectiveness of urban policies. Equally, urban policies will inevitably affect regional problems and the effectiveness of regional policies. This is particularly the case where urban policy initiatives are taken by local authorities (e.g. the London Enterprise Board) whose actions may fail to support, or be in direct conflict with, the central government aim of attracting employment into depressed regions. Even when urban policies and programmes are subject to close central government control, considerable interaction with regional policy still occurs. This is because both sets of policies can divert economic activity from one part of the country to another. If there are, for example, constraints on total public expenditure, urban policies which increase the amount of public expenditure in urban areas in prosperous regions will reduce the amount going to depressed regions. Urban and regional policies also interact because there exist causal links between the main components of each of these policies. For example, if urban policies increase employment in inner city areas, this increases the demand for infrastructure and public services in the conurbations to the detriment of other more rural areas of the country. The importance attached to understanding interaction effects is further reinforced when it is realised that direct and indirect interactions do not occur simply between urban and regional policy, but also between national sectoral policies and spatial policies. For example, government departments responsible for housing, transport, health, education, industry, the environment and employment all operate national policies with strong urban and regional implications. Partly as a consequence of coordination problems and certainly contributing to them, there are a host of special bodies charged with various responsibilities relating both to urban and regional objectives, some indeed with the task of coordinating the actions of other bodies concerned. As is shown below some UK regions are better endowed than others with such organisations. The failure to develop a comprehensive spatial strategy in Britain with clearly established economic and social objectives can probably be attributed in part to the fact that the institutional implementation of spatial policy must necessarily be fragmented. A further proliferation of institutional bodies is then likely to arise from the resulting confusion and failure to achieve spatial objectives. The fragmentation in the administration and implementation of spatial policies has also been caused by a natural tendency on the part of successive governments to introduce spatial policies, generally of a piecemeal character, as and when unacceptably serious spatial problems become apparent. Although Britain experienced 30 years of economic and social deterioration in the inner parts of the larger conurbations it took the riots of 1981 before central government began to take the problem and their policy response very seriously. There are a number of reasons why an improvement in coordination is becoming increasingly important. Firstly, regional and urban problems have become too large and persistent to be tackled in an ad hoc way. In an era of slow growth and the proliferation of unemployment in all regions, there is a need for policies to prevent increasing problems in the worst hit areas. Secondly, it has been shown in Chapter 3 that economic and social disparities between regions are frequently smaller than the disparities between and 'Yithin the larger cities, and that all the large cities are experiencing worsening problems of the kind traditionally associated with depressed regions. Thus urban and regional policies increasingly share common objectives, but for different parts of the country. In depressed regions, rural areas and cities will be in increasing conflict over jobs and scarce financial resources. Inner city areas in more prosperous regions will also compete for assistance. These conflicts have already become apparent in the policies being developed by local authorities. Finally, the slower growth of public sector financial resources available for urban and regional problems will create an increased need for policy coordination if the benefits of spatial development policies are to be maximised. The main features of the policy-coordinating framework in the UK The United Kingdom is a highly centralised unitary state. Sectoral policies are controlled by a number of powerful central government departments, each of which has some responsibility for taking account of spatial objectives when operating national policy. This structure gives rise to two kinds of coordination problem. The first type occurs when separate and potentially conflicting urban and regional policy objectives are pursued by different government departments. Secondly there is the coordination problem of ensuring that different government departments in discharging their own national policy functions simultaneously assist (or do not conflict with) the achievement of central government's spatial policy objectives. The machinery for coordination consists in part of meetings of the Cabinet and its sub-committees and, lower down the hierarchy, of an array of official, inter-departmental and ad hoc working groups, semi-permanent and temporary committees and the inter-departmental circulation of papers coordinating various aspects of the government's urban, regional and related policies. It is possible for any public servant to draw attention to potential or actual policy interactions either through these committees or by circulating a paper to interested parties in the government machine. In the absence of agreement in the various 59 committees, matters in dispute are referred upwards and might ultimately reach the Cabinet. The most striking feature of this system of coordination in Britain is that it is not very systematic. We shall consider in the next section how well it has performed in practice. There can be no presumption that the hit and miss nature of the coordinating mechanisms, which depend to a large extent on the quality of civil servants in particular posts, is necessarily 'best practice'. In making decisions affecting different parts of the country it is likely that civil servants are tempted to place the priorities of their own departments before the need to coordinate their policies with those of other departments. Spatial objectives are frequently not well defined and there is little or no formal authority or machinery to ensure that objectives are achieved or that individual policies affecting spatial developments are coordinated and integrated. Another feature of the British institutional framework is the existence of an elected and to some extent autonomous local authority tier of government. Policies of national government and local government have to be coordinated vertically to avoid conflicts of objectives and policies. The features of the central/local government relationship in Britain are: firstly, that some local services such as education are jointly provided by both central and local government; secondly, that jointly-provided services are financed partly from the proceeds of local taxes (the rates) and partly from central government funds in the shape of the rate support grant; thirdly, that local authorities have some degree of autonomy whereby local choices can be exercised with regard to the priorities given to expenditure on individual services and hence on the level of service provided; and finally, that local authorities also have extensive powers over physical planning, capital investment and development, which can affect national as well as local interests. Many aspects of imbalance at the regional or urban level have their causes in spheres of activity in which both local authorities and central government share responsibility. It is for this reason that coordination of the activities of different tiers of government is important if spatial objectives of either efficiency or equity are to be achieved. In particular local government's power to raise local taxes and provide public services gives rise to the possibility of significant variations across the country. Such differences may contribute to spatial disparities in real disposable income and living standards and may be one cause of the migration of firms and people from one locality to another. Examples of this may be found in some inner city areas where above average local tax rates reinforce the decline in population and jobs. Local authorities also have a role to play in the execution and implementation of central government spatial policies. For example, local authority cooperation is required if central government urban dispersal policies are to be effective or if the government decides to finance a factory building programme in a depressed area. More recently local authorities have devoted local rate funds to promoting and assisting industrial development in their areas. These local policies may conflict with the central government's urban and regional policies. Similar potential conflicts can arise where large numbers of people commute into large cities to work and in so doing make use of city centre services paid for in part by the local taxes of inner city residents. Another major feature of the British institutional framework is the unique position with regard to a middle or regional tier of government. In federal countries such as the USA, Canada and West Germany the middle tier of government has well developed and often predominant powers in the urban policy field and strong fiscal, economic and social powers which make it an essential partner of national government in regional policies. Policy-coordination mechanisms between all these tiers of government are thus often elaborate and well entrenched (OECD, 1982). In unitary states such as France and Italy the role of regional bodies is generally administrative and is concerned with the planning of public expenditure programmes for each region and their allocation in local areas within the region. They also have an important role to play in coordinating the physical and structure plans of local authorities in the region. Italy, as a consequence of recent reforms to strengthen the regional tier of government, now has strong regional bodies based on regionally elected assemblies, a move which is also planned in France. By contrast the British approach to a middle tier of government can best be described as ad hoc and half-hearted. Although for historical reasons Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have a strong coordinating middle tier of government (in the form of departments of state with a ministerial seat in the Cabinet) the regional tier in England has always been weak, reflecting our strongly centralised system. In the 1970s, however, regional planning boards consisting of regional officials of central government departments were established along with advisory regional planning councils appointed from the local authorities, firms, trade unions and universities of the region. They played a useful policy-coordinating role and from time to time produced 'economic strategies' for each region. But they suffered from an absence of a coherent and well established national economic planning framework, and no one in Whitehall seemed to take much notice of their work, much of which gathered dust on the shelves. There was no natural and powerful organisation within the central government structure for such regional bodies to report to and from whom to gain power and authority. The regional bodies were abolished for the English regions by the new Conservative government of 1979. However, the regional autonomy of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has been 60 strengthened. Development agencies with sizeable budgets have been set up in Wales and Scotland with powers to implement all aspects of economic restructuring. The Scottish and Welsh offices also receive Whitehall funds for local government as a block grant and have much discretion on how this is allocated to individual local authorities in Scotland and Wales. By contrast when English regions experience serious or deteriorating economic circumstances, as in the case recently with the two large manufacturing regions of the West Midlands and the North West, the representation from the regions is weak and uncoordinated and there is no single organisation in Whitehall to coordinate any central government response to the problem or to make any representations about the problem. The main characteristics of the UK institutional framework for administering spatial policies are therefore its centralisation- but with diffusion of responsibility at the centre- the informality of all coordinating machinery, the absence of a regional tier of government in England and a local government tier which has a significant amount of autonomy - though this autonomy is ill defined and easily subject to threat from central government. Does the UK institutional framework give good results? This is not the sort of question to which a simple yes or no answer can be given. However, some kind of judgement can be made from examining the conflicts between policy objectives of different institutions and the inconsistencies between the aims of the various spatial policies. Sometimes examples arise of a break-down in coordination and consultation between particular institutions. There are also cases where lack of coordination has resulted in a central government department imposing its solution to a problem by legislation against the wishes of other institutions, an outcome which is always unsatisfactory. One manifestation of a breakdown in effective policy coordination is the increased tension and conflict which has emerged in recent years between central government and local authorities over the level of local expenditure and the distribution of the rate support grant. The tension may have been less between the Scottish and Welsh local authorities and central government. Scottish and Welsh authorities have a powerful policycoordinating middle tier in the shape of the Scottish and Welsh Offices. Local authorities in England have no regional tier to represent them and reconcile their interests. Neither have they formed regional groupings but rather Associations of mainly urban and mainly rural authorities. Disagreements between these Associations, sometimes inspired by differences in political control, can be exploited by central government to the detriment of the constitutional and financial position of local authorities as a whole. There are several aspects to the increased tension which has emerged in this area. One source of conflict has arisen through central government's insistence that local authorities restrain local expenditure. Hitherto the total level of local public expenditure was a matter for agreement between the two sides, and individual local authorities had discretion to be 'high' or 'low' spenders within that total. More recently central government has sought to cut expenditure on local services (whilst many central government programmes have not been cut) and have introduced new legislation to penalise individual authorities which spend more than central government declares they should. Because of this local authorities are in danger of losing the long-established power to determine their own expenditure. Central government has therefore partly sacrificed the objective of local autonomy in favour of other objectives concerned with macroeconomic policy. A second aspect of conflict arises from the way in which the rate support grant is distributed geographically. Central government has control over the allocation mechanisms. These were changed in 1980 and with the change came a shift in the share of rate support grants away from mainly Labour-controlled urban local authorities to mainly Conservative-controlled rural shires. In bringing in the new system little attention was paid to the special needs and drastic circumstances of some inner city areas. As a consequence rate support grants were switched away from these areas even though other government programmes, notably the urban programme operated by the same government department to help such areas, were being increased. Inner London for example lost more resources through switches in rate support grant in 1980-81 than it gained through the urban programme. A third area of conflict between central and local government arises in the field of employment preservation and job creation. As national unemployment has increased many local authorities have tried to ease local employment problems by entering the business of industrial promotion and job generation, traditionally the province of central government. Local authority expenditure on this type of activity, financed from local rates, has grown rapidly in recent years. Though such a development has much to be said for it, it does raise problems, largely because of a complete lack of coordination. Thus without any change in overall budgetary policy and aggregate expenditure in the economy as a whole, local authorities will merely attract firms from each other, perhaps leaving most authorities roughly where they were before. Meanwhile rates will everywhere be higher. Moreover the local authorities which are successful in attracting jobs may not be the ones most in need. As a consequence the cost effectiveness of the central government's urban and regional policies may be reduced. A fourth area of activity where centraljlocal 61 relationships have become strained is that of physical and economic planning. At present each local authority is required to prepare a structure plan outlining the long-term development of its area. Considerable resources are devoted to preparing such plans which have to be submitted to the Department of the Environment for approval. But it is highly questionable whether this kind of system can work at all effectively under present conditions. Local authorities have great difficulty in preparing viable structure plans, firstly because there is little other than short-term economic planning at the central government level on which to 'peg' the local plans and secondly because there is no effective planning attempted at the regional level. The sum of local authority plans may thus exceed what the nation (or the region) could possibly achieve and local plans have to be continuously changed in response to short term macroeconomic decisions about, for instance, public expenditure. The absence of a middle tier of government also creates additional problems in the planning of very large projects. The history of the planning of a third London airport is a good example of the confusion which can arise. It is one of a long drawn out battle between individual local authorities and local communities on the one hand and the airport authorities and central government on the other. A regional tier of government should have a useful role to play in coordinating the policies of individual authorities towards such projects and reconciling conflicts between central and local government. The ad hoc policy-coordination machinery in the UK also manifests itself in the approach to urban and regional policy. These two policies are run by separate central government departments and there have been times when the objectives of the two policies have appeared to be in conflict with each other or, at least, when there has been a failure to recognise all the possible interactions involved. In the 1950s and 1960s the main objective of UK urban policy was to disperse both people and jobs out of the conurbations into new town and overspill areas, in order to relieve pressures on space in the conurbations, to provide better housing conditions and amenities and reduce congestion. By and large these policies were not directed at changing the balance in the local labour market. The reduction in demand in London which resulted was an unforeseen byproduct of policies aimed at achieving quite different objectives. At the same time, regional policy was providing incentives and controls to encourage employment growth in depressed regions, especially in the conurbations of Tyneside, Clydeside and Merseyside, which were designated special development areas. The evidence we have indicates that employment effects of regional policies on the northern conurbations was partly offset by the effects of urban dispersal policy pulling in the other direction. Since the onset of recession in 1973, it has no longer been possible to say that the traditionally more prosperous conurbations have 'excess demand' for labour; indeed in the inner areas unemployment rates amongst residents exceeds the national average. Under these conditions regional policy creates jobs in the depressed regions mainly at the expense of jobs in the prosperous conurbations. As explained in Chapter 4, there are social priorities which justify this movement of jobs. Nevertheless, the two policies are in conflict insofar as an active regional policy may adversely affect the achievements of urban policy objectives and vice versa. Since 1976/7 urban policy has switched from one seeking to disperse jobs and population from the conurbations to one which seeks, via such policies as enterprise zones and the abandonment of further overspill and new town schemes, to maintain and increase employment in the conurbations. Thus urban policy in relatively prosperous conurbations now conflicts with the objectives of regional policy whilst urban policy towards the depressed conurbations now shares the same objective as regional policy. The switch in policy came very late. The ad hoc institutional arrangements for spatial policy contributed to the failure adequately to assess the consequences for inner city areas of 25 years of a policy of dispersal away from the conurbations. As a result, inner city economic and social problems, which have been allowed to become extremely serious, will be with us throughout the 1980s and beyond. In spite of these weaknesses in coordination, the historical record of spatial policy in the UK is not one of unmitigated disaster. There has been a willingness on the part of most recent governments to introduce and develop spatial policies in pursuit of more uniform economic and social conditions in the UK. But the institutional framework which devises, implements and coordinates spatial policies could surely be significantly improved. Ways to improve the institutional framework for policy coordination This chapter has identified three aspects of the British institutional framework which are arguably weak and capable of improvement: (i) urban and regional policy have been treated separately in policy planning and implementation and diffused amongst several central government departments; (ii) the links to, and coordination with, other sectoral departments of central government have been weak; (iii) the absence of an effective regional tier of government or administration has caused difficulties in coordination of policies and increased tension and conflict between central government and· English local government. This points to a possible need for two reforms: 62 firstly more effective treatment of spatial problems within central government possibly by giving one department responsibility for all spatial policies, and secondly an effective middle tier of government or administration for English regions. These should not be regarded as radical or even new proposals. Post-war governments of all shades of political opinion have, from time to time, considered reforms in either or both of these areas. Ironically however, proposals to strengthen the middle or regional tier of government have usually taken the form of'devolution' for Scotland and Wales, which happen to be the only two 'regions' of the UK which already had an effective regional tier of government. Attempts to improve the coordination of spatial policies have been fewer. The creation of very large Departments of Environment and Technology could have helped but it is not apparent that it has been any easier to coordinate policies within these very large departments. The National Plan of the mid 1960s and the creation of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) was a reform of the institutional framework designed to improve policy coordination at the central and regional levels simultaneously. But when the plan was abandoned and the DEA abolished, the remaining regional planning bodies had no national framework to work within. Previous attempts at institutional reform, therefore, are not very encouraging. This has not deterred political parties from wanting to try again in future. The Labour Party have published proposals to set up a new Department of Economic and Industrial Planning together with regional planning bodies which would be designed to give national and local economic planning a regional focus, to help decentralise certain decisions from the national to the local level, and to encourage and coordinate local initiatives. The keynote discussion in the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties is about decentralising decision-making to elected regional assemblies. The experience of other countries can provide an insight into the shape which sensible and useful reforms to the institutional framework for policy coordination might take. Three broad approaches to the problems of horizontal coordination can be distinguished. One approach typified by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States, relies on informal committees and a variety of ad hoc inter-departmental consultative arrangements. The second approach, which might include Greece and Spain, is characterised by a strong central government department charged specifically with the task of horizontal coordination. The third approach is adopted by countries, such as Italy, Canada and Austria, where the middle tier of government has a prominent part to play in both horizontal and vertical coordination. There is evidence that coordination of policies in a number of these other countries has not always been effective. The main problems seem to arise when different aspects of spatial policy are the responsibility of several government departments between which coordination practices rely on ad hoc machinery and individual initiative. Secondly coordination does not seem to work well when the response to coordination problems has been to set up a large number of special agencies and bodies all of which may have some ill-defined coordinating role to play but where each one lacks the power and status to coordinate comprehensively. We contend that there is a prima facie case for devising in the UK a means by which urban, regional and other spatial policies are formulated and implemented within an integrated spatial policy framework. If this is to be achieved there may be considerable benefit from organising an integrated spatial policy within a single organisation, charged with a comprehensive coordinating role for securing spatial development objectives. This body could operate specific policies on its own account but would also coordinate the activities of other departments which have spatial implications. Inevitably in order to have sufficient power and status to secure spatial objectives effectively this organisation has to operate within the top tier of government; it could however fall within the responsibilities of a strong existing government department rather than be the responsibility of a new separate ministry. Because horizontal coordination of spatial policies is essential at each tier of government it is important that potential conflicts between tiers be reconciled at the same time as horizontal coordination takes place. As there are a very substantial number of local authorities in the third tier it is useful and helpful that an effective regional tier should act as a two-way channel of information and communication between central and local government, just as for example regional hospital boards carry out this role between the Department of Health and local hospitals. To be effective the regional tier needs to secure the necessary influence and representation within the coordinating framework in order to involve all levels of government in implementing local and regional economic development strategies. The middle or regional tier could take one of a number of different forms. It need not be a fully-fledged elected regional assembly. Indeed such an innovation might make policy coordination more difficult because the assemblies might themselves adopt independent objectives which were in conflict with those of the other two tiers of government. As a first step it may be preferable to create a regional administrative body which drew its membership from elected representatives and officials in the other two tiers of government. Such regional councils might consist of the elected leaders and chief executives of the county authorities in the region, the heads of the regional offices of each central government department, perhaps three Members of Parliament nominated or elected by all MPs with constituen- 63 cies in the region, the chief executives of existing regional boards (e.g. Health and Water) under the chairmanship of a minister or senior official from the new central government body responsible for coordinating all spatial policies. This is just one of many possible ways of adding a meaningful regional dimension to policy making and coordination. In this chapter we have not attempted to go very far into this institutional debate which extends well beyond issues of economic policy, although we do conclude that there is a case for introducing some kind of regional tier of administration in England to coordinate central government policies with those of local government. It is important however that any change of this kind is seen only as a framework for policy and not as a policy per se. In itself, a move towards regional government is unlikely to bring substantial material benefits to the residents of disadvantaged regions. These benefits will depend more on the urban and regional policies pursued than on the framework within which they are enacted. The institutional framework does however matter and it is possible to argue that a significant amount of political pressure has built up over the last twenty years for some sort of institutional or even constitutional change. The persistent postwar failure of either national or urban and regional policies to bring full employment to the more disadvantaged parts of the UK has placed a strain on the consensus which necessarily underlies the form of administration in any democracy. Nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales, separatist pressures in Northern Ireland and the inner city riots of 1981 have all occurred in areas of relatively high unemployment. Each can be seen as an example of the faltering consensus, even though the form of opposition varies in both type and degree depending on local circumstances. Part of the same process is electoral polarisation, in which depressed regions and inner cities have tended to increase their support for the Labour party, while southern and rural areas have become more strongly Conservative. English regions and cities have been as much affected as Scotland or Wales, and by 1979 only a third of voters in the northern regions of Britain were supporting the Conservatives compared with over half in the south. The drift towards political differentiation is currently being continued in pressure for a regional tier of government which is reflected in the programmes of both the Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party. To an extent the pressure is a reaction among northern politicians to the perceived advantages of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in having both well-funded development agencies and their own government ministers of cabinet rank. It is also however a response to the withdrawal of regional policy assistance at a time of increasing economic difficulty. 64  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Chapter 5 Policy coordination and the institutional framework Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Graham Gudgin Barry Moore John Rhodes Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Cambridge Economic Policy Review Volume 8 No 2, pages 58 - 64 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1982