https://cpes.org.uk/om/files/original/f0f5c373870cebf3e2e8b5ad580e5180.pdf 31652bc50e9ab8dcf184a6943a7f87fb Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Cambridge Economic Policy Review Volume 8 No 1 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1982 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Chapter 2 Will British industry recover? by lain Begg and John Rhodes Since 1979 manufacturing output in Britain has fallen precipitously and industrial capacity has been reduced. Although North Sea oil has so far protected the living standards of the great majority of people from the effects of this fall in output, the prospects for employment in the 1980s and beyond depend critically on the competitive strength of industry. Unless Britain's industrial trade performance improves significantly there can be no sustained economic recovery and little chance of creating new jobs. Worse, without such an improvement there is the prospect of steady impoverishment of the UK when oil and gas production goes into decline in the 1990s. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the decline in manufacturing in Britain in recent years, to explain why it has happened and to assess alternative approaches to bringing about industrial regeneration. It is shown that although manufacturing industry in this country has been hit in the past two years by world recession, the fall in output has been far steeper than can be explained by this alone and more pronounced than in other countries. It is argued that over the long term British industry has suffered a cumulative decline in international competitiveness, manifest in falling shares of overseas markets and increasing import penetration, which is both the consequence and cause of an unfavourable macroeconomic environment, characterised by slow growth, low profits and insufficient job opportuni- ties. This explanation contrasts with the present government's view that excessive wages, trade union practices and weak management are the main causes of poor industrial performance. If the former rather than the latter view is correct, the government's policy of attrition designed to bring about a fundamental change in attitudes may in practice make things worse rather than better. Thus far, at least, there is no firm evidence at all to support the contention that the performance of British industry has already begun to be transformed as a result of the present government's policy. 2.1 The recent fall in industrial output Throughout the post-war period manufacturing in Britain has grown more slowly than in other major industrial countries. Since 1970, this disparity in performance has increased. In 1979, even before the recent collapse in output, manufacturing production in the UK was only about 5% above its level at the beginning of the decade, whereas the industries of most other European countries were producing at least 25% more and those in the US and Japan 40% more (see Table 2.1). Between 1979 and 1981 manufacturing output in Britain fell by 15%, more even than in the inter-war depression and far more than in any other industrial country. In Japan production Table 2.1 Manufacturing output in various countries, 1970-81 (indices, 1970 = 100) 1970 1973 1975 1979 1981 United States Japan EEC (excl. UK) of which: W. Germany France Italy 100 122 109 144 142 100 128 109 145 160 100 115 108 128 125 100 113 103 122 119 100 122 114 136 125 100 114 107 131 136 UK 100 Ill 102 106 91 Source: Indicators of Industrial Activity, OECD 18 actually rose by over 10% in this period and in Italy it rose by 4%, while in the US the fall was only around 1Y2%. The fall in manufacturing was 2Vz% in Germany and 8% in France. Since over 40% of Britain's manufactured exports go to other EEC countries, recession in Europe has certainly contributed to the recent decline in production in this country. In aggregate, though, overseas markets for British goods continued to grow in 1980 and 1981 by almost 5% a year - in line with those of other European countries (see Table 2.2). The volume of Britain's manufactured exports fell slightly in these two years because, as in the past, Britain's market share declined significantly. Table 2.2 The growth of major industrial countries' export markets (growth rates, % per year) 1973-75 1975-79 1979-81 France 3.4 7.2 4.7 W. Germany 3.1 7.5 4.4 Italy 5.2 7.8 5.5 USA 0 6.6 5.4 Japan 6.5 7.6 6.5 UK 4.3 Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 7.7 4.8 The main cause of falling production since 1979 is to be found in the home market for manufactured goods, which contracted by 16% between 1979 and 1981. There can be no question that the primary cause of this contraction of the UK market, which exceeded anything experienced in any other country, was the government's adoption of restrictive monetary policies and the gross over-valuation of the exchange rate which together pushed down expenditure on investment and prompted heavy destocking by undermining manufacturers' and distributors' confidence in future sales. Most other Western governments, despite suffering a sharp rise in the cost of oil imports which Britain escaped (having its own supplies in the North Sea), have pursued less restrictive policies and therefore avoided the scale of market contraction experienced here. The British government, though denying direct responsibility for the industrial collapse which has occurred, has claimed that the establishment of a harsher market environment, in which firms can no longer rely on the state propping up demand or providing financial aid, is the best and perhaps only way of correcting the lack of competitiveness of British industry. The closure of plants and reduction in employment over the past two years is regarded as an inevitable first stage of industrial restructuring - a necessary elimination of inefficient production and eradication of over- manning. There is little doubt that British manufacturers have found it increasingly difficult to compete on world markets over the post-war period, as shown in the next section. It is much less clear that the government's approach to this problem will result in a better trade performance in the future. 2.2 Trade performance The share of British manufactures in world trade has tended to decline throughout the post-war period. The fall during the 1960s was particularly marked, from around 14% at the beginning of the decade to 9% in 1970. Since then, however, the British share has held up better. In value terms at around 8% in 1980 it was little below its level ten years earlier. Because of the slowdown in world trade growth following the 1973-74 oil price rise, the rate of increase in exports in the 1970s was on average less than in the 1960s. It also still fell short of the rate of increase in other Western European countries, though not by as much as in earlier years (see Table 2.3). Table 2.3 The growth of manufactured exports of EEC countries (national accounts basis at 1975 purchasing power) Growth rates per annum 1960-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 W. Germany 6.4 5.0 4.7 France 7.0 8.4 5.0 Italy 10.2 8.5 5.7 Netherlands 6.4 4.5 2.9 Belgium 7.8 2.7 4.1 Ireland 11.6 9.2 13.2 Denmark 6.8 4.7 3.8 UK 3.8 3.9 3.0 EEC9 6.5 5.5 4.5 Source: Eurostat, Monthly External Trade Bulletin Much of the loss in market share has been in engineering products and vehicles (SITC 7) which account for almost half of UK exports of manufactures and in which the general rate of technological advance has been rapid. Between 1965 and 1970 the share of British producers in the world market for these .types of product fell from 12Vz% to 9% and since then it has declined further to 8% in 1980 (see Table 2.4). By contrast, the share of British producers has held up much better in the more basic, relatively unsophisticated and slower-growing trades such as textiles and metal manufacture which make up SITC categories 6 and 8. Here the UK share was much the same in 1980 as it had been ten years earlier. The trade 19 - Table 2.4 Shares of UK manufactures in foreign trade, by product group and main market, 1965-1980 (% of total imports into each market) 1965 1970 1975 1980 Chemicals (SITC 5) World Developed countries of which: EEC Developing countries of which: Middle East 10.8 9.0 8.3 8.9 11.3 9.7 9.4 10.0 9.9 8.0 8.9 10.7 11.9 9.3 7.7 7.6 17.0 12.6 11.5 13.9 Engineering Products (SITC 7) World Developed countries of which: EEC Developing countries of which: Middle East 12.6 9.2 14.4 10.6 11.5 9.7 14.4 10.7 15.8 12.4 7.8 8.2 8.9 9.2 9.5 11.2 8.2 8.4 9.9 9.3 Metals, Textiles etc (SITC 6 and 8) World 9.3 7.7 6.7 7.7 Developed countries 10.2 8.4 7.9 9.2 of which: EEC 8.3 6.9 6.7 8.9 Developing countries 9.6 7.2 6.1 5.7 of which: Middle East 11.9 8.3 6.7 6.1 Sources: OECD, Trade by Commodities (various issues); Overseas Trade Statistics ofthe UK (various issues); United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May 1981; and GATT, International Trade, /980-8/ performance of Britain's chemical producers has also been relatively good, but these account for only around 15% of the total value of exports. As would be expected, the share of British manufactures in EEC trade has tended to increase since UK entry in 1973, particularly in chemicals and SITC categories 6 and 8 (see Table 2.4). But the increase has not been all that large and the UK share remains much lower than that of Germany or France. Moreover it has been accompanied by a continued loss of trade in markets outside the Community and has led to a position where almost half of UK manufactured exports now go to the slowly-growing European market. At the same time as Britain's share of world export markets has declined, foreign manufacturers have taken an ever-increasing share of the British market. The proportion of domestic expenditure going on imported manufactured goods has risen persistently from just 6% in 1960 to 9% in 1970 and to over 15% in 1980, a much more rapid increase than in Germany, France or Italy, or indeed in any other Community member (see Table 2.5). All sectors of industry have been affected. Engineering and vehicle producers have seen import penetration double since 1970 with a consequent loss of almost 20% of potential home sales to overseas manufacturers (see Table 2.6). Most of this loss has been not to Japan or newly- industrialising countries in the Far East but to producers in the rest of the EEC who now account for half of all manufactured goods imported into the UK. Table 2.5 Import penetration of manufactured goods in EEC countries (ratio of manufactured imports to total domestic expenditure) 1970 1975 1980 W. Germany 10.0 10.8 13.3 France 8.6 9.3 12.0 Italy 8.0 8.9 12.4 Netherlands 27.9 27.4 27.1 Belgium 30.3 31.8 36.4 Ireland 27.0 29.8 39.3 Denmark 19.4 18.1 17.6 UK 9.2 12.5 15.4 Sources: Eurostat, Monthly External Trade Bulletin and Eurostat, National Accounts The combined effect of sluggish export growth and increasing import penetration has been not only to depress output directly but also, and more importantly, to make it impossible for Britain to 20 Table 2.6 Import penetration by Industrial Sector, 1970-80 (% of home market sales) 1970 1975 1980 Chemicals (SITC 5) Engineering products (SITC 7) Metals, textiles, etc (SITC 6 and 8) 18 23 29 19 30 37 14 18 24 Sources: Economic Trends, June 1980; Business Monitor, MQ12, December 1980 and National Income and Expenditure (Blue Book), 1981 (for output weights used to aggregate import penetration ratios for product groups) earn a manufacturing surplus to pay for necessary imports of food and raw materials at anywhere close to full employment. The growth of domestic expenditure has, therefore, had to be held back to prevent mounting balance of payments deficits. Even with the demand for imports held down in this way, the surplus on manufacturing trade has fallen substantially from 7% of national income in 1960 to 5% in 1970 and only 2% in 1980. 2.3 The government's view of industrial decline The present government's approach to the competitive weakness of British industry rests on the notion that poor trade performance has been largely due to a lack of market discipline on management and labour which led to excessive wage costs while new technology and changes in working practices were resisted. These problems, it is claimed, can best be overcome by exposing both sides of industry to market forces and at the same time withdrawing state support for firms which get into financial difficulty. In this way, the position of management is strengthened and workers are forced to adopt a more realistic attitude to pay and working conditions. In reality, however, the evidence which exists does not wholly support the government's line. In the first place, wages in Britain, far from being high, are in fact very low in comparison with those in other Western European countries. Hourly labour costs, expressed in terms of a common currency unit, were little more than half the Community average in 1978 and much less than half those in Germany (see Table 2.7). Although this comparison will have altered since 1978 as a result of the appreciation of sterling and the more rapid increase of pay in Britain, labour costs here are still far below those faced by manufacturers elsewhere in Europe. For producers contemplating building a new plant, the UK would appear to be a very cheap location. Average productivity in existing plants in Britain is much below that in most other European countries although, until the recent appreciation in sterling, low wages compensated for this. Up to Table 2.7 Hourly labour costs in manufacturing in Britain and Europe in terms of a common currency unit (average for all countries = 100) 1975 1978 W. Germany France Italy Netherlands Belgium Denmark 115 121 94 92 70 63 129 129 118 132 115 108 UK 59 Source: Eurostat Review, 1970-79 53 1978 exchange rate changes kept labour costs per unit of output broadly in line with those elsewhere and, in contrast to the 1960s when the sterling exchange rate by and large remained fixed, British exporters of manufactures were more successful in holding onto their share of world markets, as noted above. There is not much evidence that low productivity in Britain is due to incompetent managers or to the inherent inefficiency of the labour force. The latter proposition is in any event virtually impossible to test since it requires the effect of all the many other factors influencing the efficiency with which work is carried out in Britain to be measured and allowed for. There is some evidence to suggest that British managers are no worse on average than those from other countries. For example, British companies in the UK, though less profitable than US-owned companies operating here, have tended to earn a higher rate of profit than UK subsidiaries of European companies (see Table 2.8). Table 2.8 Profitabilityи of British and foreign firms in manufacturing in the UK (percentages) Firms in UK British European American 1965-70 7.7 6.3 10.7 1971-76 8.5 6.8 10.7 a Profits net of tax and depreciation as a percentage of net assets. Source: M. Panic, International direct investment in conditions of structural disequilibrium: UK experience since the 1960s, in J .H. Dunning and J. Black (Eds) International Capital Movements, Macmillan, London, (forthcoming) Though comparisons are fraught with difficulty, the profitability of manufacturing in Britain seems for some time to have been lower than in other countries (see Table 2.9). Moreover manufactur- 21 Table 2.9 Net rate of return on capital и in manufacturing in major countries Averages per period UK Canada USA 1960-71 1972-75 1976-79 13 18 30 8 17 21 6 14 22b a Defined as net operating surplus as percentage of net capital stock of fixed assets (excluding land) b 1976-1978 Source: International comparisons of profitability, British Business, 4 September, 1981 (per cent) West Germany 23 16 17 ing investment per head here has been much below that in the rest of Europe. Although the gap narrowed in the 1970s, investment per head in Britain was only just over 70% of the Community average in 1979, and less than half the figure in Germany (see Table 2.10). Part of the explanation for the low productivity of British manufacturing could therefore lie in low amounts of capital per head and the age of factories and equipment in use. Table 2.10 Investment per head in manufacturing in terms of a common currency (EEC 9 = 100) 1970 1975 1979 W. Germany 156 134 155 France 101 116 106 Italy 60 73 64 Netherlands 122 98 96 Belgium 121 138 86 UK 65 66 72 Source: Eurostat Review, 1970-79 2.4 An alternative view Many explanations are advanced for Britain's industrial decline. Poor industrial relations, inadequate education and training, financial institutions which give a low priority to the needs of industry, and numerous other factors have been cited at one time or another as important causes of competitive weakness. Many do represent serious problems, but in our view they are as much the consequences of industrial malaise as the causes. They can all be seen as part of a cumulative process of slow growth, low rates of productivity increase, low profits, low wages and low investment which has persisted for a long time. Even around the turn of the century studies were pointing out enormous differences in levels of productivity between Britain and its main industrial competitors. Then, as now, there was evidence of delay in the application of new technology and in the development of new products as well as of a preponderance of out-dated plants operating in inefficient ways. Whatever initiated this process of relative industrial decline (part of the explanation may lie in the legacy of old plant and production methods left by early industrialisation) it is inherently difficult to halt and reverse. Slow growth of sales discourages investment in new capacity and, by depressing profits, reduces the ability of firms to finance investment expenditure. Low profits tend also to retard product innovation and to reduce expenditure on industrial training. This in turn further diminishes the ability of home manufacturers to compete with overseas counterparts and is liable to lead to a continuing loss in market shares. As trade performance deteriorates, governments have been forced to hold down growth of domestic expenditure to avoid balance of payments problems, reinforcing the downward spiral. In such a situation, conflict between management and the labour force has become acute. Not only is there strong pressure on managers to hold down wages as a means of compensating for declining sales, but also productivity gains in the context of a stagnant market almost inevitably entail job losses. It may not be too surprising that workers should resist the introduction of new technology and changes in working methods if this is the only way they have of trying to safeguard their employment. 2.5 Remedies for industrial decline If there is validity in this view of Britain's industrial decline - and the evidence referred to earlier on the co-existence of low wages, low profits and low investment is at least consistent with it - there are important implications for policy. Attempts by the government to spur managers and workers to greater effort by creating a more hostile economic environment could well prove counter-productive. Such a policy may succeed in motivating managers to strive more strenuously to avert losses, if only for the sake of survival, and may reduce the ability of workers to resist new technology and changes in working methods. But, at the same time, the fact that sales are being depressed by demand restriction removes both the incentive and the finance for 22 investment in plant and equipment, product design and labour training. The chief danger is that financial gains may be achieved by closing down plants and cutting back postponable expenditure. This kind of short-term response may actually worsen the longer-term ability of British industry to compete on world markets. The government's policy may succeed in pushing down wages to the point where labour costs are reduced enough to make existing production profitable even at low-capacity operation and with the present high exchange rate for sterling. Overseas companies may be attracted to locate in Britain and UK companies may desist from shifting production abroad. To this extent there could be an industrial recovery based on the relative cheapness of British labour. But although there is no way of being sure that the present government's approach will not strengthen the industrial base, the risk of failure seems high. The alternative approach, strongly suggested by cumulative elements in the process of industrial decline set out above, is to try to create a favourable macro-economic environment which, by raising profits and improving sales prospects, encourages investment in more productive processes and new products. Such investment is widely believed to be a primary factor underlying the performance of industrial companies in international trade, far more important in the long term than the level of wages. So long as growth of sales can be expected with some confidence, productivity can rise without jeopardising jobs and wages can increase without threatening profits. Under such conditions, the conflicting objectives of management and workers can be better accommodated. The critical problem is how to sustain demand expansion in the context of inherited industrial weakness. It is on their ability to resolve this problem that strategies for regenerating British industry and achieving economic recovery have to be judged, as explained in Chapter 1. 2.6 Is government policy working? It is repeatedly claimed by government supporters that present policies are beginning to improve industrial performance. Stories abound of particular companies achieving substantial gains in efficiency, managers pushing through reorganisation plans previously resisted, workers being more cooperative or exporters winning large new orders. What is important, however, is not that these things should be happening - it has always been possible to find analogous examples in the past- but the scale on which they are taking place. The evidence on this from official statistical sources is far from clear, despite what government ministers have been claiming in recent months. In their view, the figures show an unusually rapid growth in productivity, greatly improved trade performance and significant gains in cost competitiveness. All of these contentions contain an element of truth, but reports about the beginnings of industrial regeneration are premature. The figures for output per man (or man-hour) in manufacturing do show a significant increase in 1981, rising by almost 10% in the first three quarters of the year. But this was preceded by a very sharp fall in productivity in 1980, so that the level of output per man in the third quarter of 1981 was only 3% above the 1979 level, hardly evidence of an economic miracle. Moreover the recent movement in productivity is not wildly out of line with movements following previous downturns in output (see Chart 2.1). In both 1972 and 1975-76, output per man rose sharply as a fall in output eased or was reversed, possibly as a consequence of delays in employers adjusting their labour forces to changes in output. The increase in productivity in 1981 was somewhat more rapid than would have been expected from past experience. At the same time the fall in output has been greater and more prolonged than in the past and there is far less optimism about future prospects. Accordingly, given the continued squeeze on company finances, pressure on manufacturers to reduce employment remains, so that short-term increases in sales are likely to be met more by over-time working than by new recruitment. In the long term, the scope for raising productivity through labour shedding is limited. Sustained growth in productivity depends crucially on investment in new plant and equipment. Yet investment in manufacturing has been hit severely by the collapse in output and profits over the past two years. Between the end of 1979 and the third quarter of 1981, manufacturing investment (including leasing) fell by almost 30%, considerably more than in previous recessions (Chart 2.1). There is no sign here of imminent industrial recovery. Indeed the main recent growth of investment has been abroad rather than in the UK. Financial companies and pension funds in particular have taken advantage of the abolition of exchange controls by moving an increasing proportion of funds into foreign assets. In the first half of 1981, for example, financial institutions invested half as much again in the securities of foreign companies as in those of British ones. So far as trade performance is concerned, the evidence is uncertain because of the civil service dispute. It is true that Britain's surplus on trade in manufactures increased in 1980 and 1981 and that the share of British exporters in world markets is now higher than it was before the present government took office. But the comparatively robust performance of exports is less the result of an improvement in industrial competitiveness than a rearguard action in which firms seek to maintain their position in hard-won export markets by accepting lower profit margins, as indicated by 23 Chart 2.1 Changes in output, productivity and investment in manufacturing in successive recessions Indices at 1975 prices (quarterly indices, quarter 0 = 100) 1970(4)- 1973(2) ииииииии.............. ии.............................. ииии-и----...., ,.... ........ .... ............, ...., ,.... ...., ....................................... Productivity Output .............. ""- ____ .,..,. ""' Investment 1974(2)- 1976(4) ______ . , . , , ииии-ии-ии-ии-ии-и-ии------иииии....,,';~l&ii~~~--~~YU'~::~ .,.... ,........иииииииииииии ииииииииииии Productivity Output ........... ______ ....._ .._ .................. - Investment - 1979(2)- 1981(4) , ........__ ииииииииии-....:_ ...... - ...._..._. :и-'-~........-..-........................................... ...... Productivity ' ........ ................ .... , Output ' , Investment 70.L-------------~~--_.----~--~----~----~--_.____. ___~----~ 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Quarters since previous output peak 24 Table 2.11 The UK share of world manufactures exports and import penetration, 1970-1981 UK exports as % of world imports Imports as % of UK market sales Value Volume Value Volume 1970 1975 1979 1980 1981 (est.) 8.6 8.1 16.8 16.5 7.4 7.4 22.2 22.5 7.8 6.7 25.7 28.3 8.1 6.4 25.4 30.9 7.0 5.5 25.8 32.5 Sources: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics: OECD, Trade by Commodities; Overseas Trade Statistics of the UK, GATT, International Trade 1980, and Business Monitor, MQI2 Table 2.12, with damaging consequences for profits and future investment. The trade surplus largely reflects the extent to which domestic expenditure, on both home and foreign products, has been depressed. Although according to official figures (so far as they exist) the share of the home market taken by foreign producers has risen less rapidly since 1979, these figures relate to the value of sales rather than to the volume. Once allowance is made for the low rise in the price of imported goods made possible by the strong appreciation of sterling, a different picture emerges (see Table 2.11). Import penetration appears to have continued to increase over the past two years at much the same rate as before. At the same time, the volume of manufactures exports has failed to grow: in 1981 it may even have been lower than in 1979. In volume terms there is no question that the share of British manufactures in world trade declined substantially in the years 1979 to 1981 (as Table 2.11 shows), and that this was in large measure a consequence of the unprecedented deterioration in cost competitiveness caused by sterling appreciation at a time of high domestic inflation (see Table 2.12). This same appreciation has caused the prices of British exports to increase relative to those of foreign producers, which alone explains the rise in the UK's share of world trade in value terms in 1979 and 1980. There are already signs of a sharp decline in the UK value share in 1981 as relatively high prices discourage overseas demand for British goods. Finally, it is also true, as the government states, that there has been some improvement in cost competitiveness in 1981 as a result of low pay settlements coupled with a small fall in sterling. But the improvement was minimal in relation to the scale of the deterioration in the preceding two years. At present, the relative costs of manufacturing in Britain are probably at least 30% higher than they were in 1978. 2.7 Future prospects The measurable effects of the present government's policy have been a fall in manufacturing output of over 15%, job losses in Table 2.12 Unit wage costs and competitiveness in UK manufacturing industry (indices, 1975 = 100) Relative export prices Relative Relative unit wholesale labour cost prices (normalised) 1976 97 94 94 1977 102 100 90 1978 108 103 98 1979 115 114 113 1980 128 131 139 1981 1980 I 123 125 126 II 126 129 134 III 131 132 141 IV 135 137 147 1981 I II 141 154 137 147 Source: Economic Trends manufacturing of around 20%, an even bigger fall in investment, innumerable plant closures and the virtual elimination of industrial profits. These results have to be set against the tenuous evidence of improved industrial competitiveness discussed above. Despite all this, it is conceivable that under present policies the performance of British industry will from now on be better. But it takes an extreme act of faith to suppose that the scale of the improvement, without a radical change in policy, can be such as to stabilise or reduce unemployment. To reduce unemployment by 1 million in the remainder of this decade would require manufacturing output to grow from now on by around 5% a year, far in excess of anything achieved in the past for more than a year or two at a time. This rate of growth would have to be sustained, despite the probability of sluggish growth in the world economy. It would be necessary for British producers not only to hold, but to expand their share of world markets steadily andjor to resist import penetration of the home market far more effectively than in the past. For example, if world trade 25 11 were to grow at a similar rate in future as in the period since 1973, British manufactures would have to increase their share from around 8% at present to over 9V2% in 1990, given the probable rise in import penetration. To put such an improvement of market share in perspective, it means that UK producers would have to achieve about the same rise in their market share in the 1980s as Japanese manufacturers achieved in the 1970s. Claims that Britain's industrial problems are almost over should be looked at with this requirement in mind. и 26 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Chapter 2 Will British industry recover? Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Iain Begg John Rhodes Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Cambridge Economic Policy Review Volume 8 No 1, pages 18 - 26 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1982